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Abstract   This chapter utilises scholarship in philosophy of biology and philosophy of chemistry 
to produce meaningful implications for biology and chemistry education. The primary purpose for 
studying philosophical literature is to identify different perspectives on the nature of laws and 
explanations within these disciplines. The goal is not to resolve on-going debates about the nature 
of laws and explanations but to consider their multiple forms and purposes in ways that promote 
deep and practical understanding of biological and chemical knowledge in educational contexts. 
Most studies on the nature of science in science education tend to focus on general features of 
scientific knowledge and under-emphasise disciplinary nuances. The authors aims to contribute to 
science education research by focusing on the characterisations of laws and explanations in 
biology and chemistry in the philosophical literature, and illustrating how the typical coverage of 
biology and chemistry textbooks does not problematise meta-perspectives on the nature of laws 
and explanations. The chapter concludes with suggestions for making science teaching, learning, 
and curriculum more inclusive of the epistemological dimensions of biology and chemistry.  
 
1  Introduction 
 
The teaching of history and philosophy of science (HPS) in science education has been advocated 
for several decades2. In recent years, however, there has been increasing interest in the 
philosophical examination of biology and chemistry as distinct branches of science that differ 
epistemically from physics in significant ways. Philosophers of biology (Hull 1973, Mayr 2004, 
Ruse 1988) and philosophers of chemistry (Bhushan & Rosenfeld 2000, van Brakel 2000, Scerri 
& McIntyre 1997) have offered insights into the epistemologies of biology and chemistry. 
However these insights have not been integrated sufficiently into biology and chemistry education 
research, curriculum materials, and classroom practice. Research on the nature of science in 
science education could benefit from such insights in order to improve understanding of not only 
the disciplinary knowledge but also the meta-level characterisations of scientific knowledge at 
large.  
 
                                               
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2011 IHPST conference and published in F. 
Seroglou, V. Koulountzos, & A. Siatras (Eds), Science & culture: Promise, challenge and demand. 
Proceedings for the 11th International IHPST and 6th Greek History, Philosophy and Science Teaching 
Joint Conference. 1-5 July 2011, Thessaloniki, Greece: Epikentro. 
 
2 See for example Duschl 1990, Hodson 1988, Matthews 1994, and Schwab 1958 & 1978. 
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 As science educators we are concerned with the question of how philosophical insights 
into scientific knowledge can inform science teaching and learning. The goal is not to contribute 
to the debates in the philosophy of biology and chemistry, but rather to draw out some aspects of 
these debates that are relevant for education in light of evidence from empirical studies in science 
education (e.g. Dagher & Cossman 1992, Erduran & Jimenez-Aleixandre 2008, Sandoval & 
Millwood 2005). In doing so, we problematise the current state of under utilisation of the 
epistemological aspects of disciplinary knowledge in science education, and illustrate with 
examples how it can be practically addressed. It is hoped that the discussion will assist other 
science education researchers in exploring the philosophical literature for clarifying and justifying 
educational goals that relate to scientific knowledge claims. 
 
 According to Irzik and Nola (this handbook), science can be perceived as a cognitive-
epistemic system and as a social system. Scientific knowledge, which constitutes one component 
of the cognitive-epistemic system, is the culmination of scientific inquiry and includes laws, 
theories, and models. Focusing on these structural elements in the context of any single discipline 
would be necessary to understand the nature of that discipline. Among these elements, 
explanations and particularly laws have been understudied from an epistemological perspective in 
science education research. For instance, while there is a substantial body of literature broadly on 
models (e.g. Justi 2000), the study of the particular epistemological aspects of models has been 
scarce (e.g. Adúriz-Bravo 2012, Adúriz-Bravo & Galagovsky 2001, Erduran & Duschl 2004). 
Similarly, despite the importance of laws and explanations in the science disciplines, relevance of 
their epistemic nature to educational practice is seldom explored (e.g. McComas 2003, Sandoval 
& Reiser 2004). 
 
 One often-cited misunderstanding of the nature of science (NOS) concerns scientific laws. 
Classified as the number one NOS myth by McComas (1998), many individuals tend to believe 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
pass on their way to final acceptance as matu?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that science starts out with facts, progresses to hypotheses, then theories, then when confirmed, to 
laws. Another myth pertains to the idea that scientific laws are absolute (McComas 1998). These 
beliefs represent only two of many other misunderstandings about the nature of scientific 
knowledge and pose challenges regarding the best approach to deconstruct them. Several 
approaches have been proposed for countering these and other nature of science misconceptions 
(Clough 1994, Khishfe & Abd-El-Khalick 2002, Schwartz et al. 2004), but it remains unclear 
whether efforts to enhance student understandings of the nature of science have resulted in 
significant or lasting improvements (Lederman 2007). 
 
 The context of laws provides a crucial and relevant nexus for promoting the 
epistemological aspects of biology and chemistry in the classroom. Focusing on the nature of laws 
in biology education, for example, serves not only to clear existing misconceptions (as the ones 
mentioned earlier) but offers insight into basic metaphysical and ontological aspects of the 
discipline which can enhance student understanding of the subject?????????????????????????????
chemistry education not only elaborates on this important philosophical thesis but also offers 
some insight into how students' interest in philosophical aspects of chemistry might be stimulated. 
Scientific explanations on the other hand refer often to how and why something happens (Chinn 
& Brown 2000). Typically scientists explain phenomena by determining how and why they occur 
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along with the conditions surrounding the observed events (Nagel 1961).  Explanations are 
important components of scientific theories. They are the backbone of scientific claims, and are 
consequently a central target for epistemological disputes. It is through the refutation or support 
of components of scientific explanations that the fabric of theories is woven. In science education, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ility to substantiate their explanations 
using reasons and evidence.   
 
 Despite the separation of laws and explanations for contrast in biology and chemistry in 
this chapter for educational purposes, the distinction of these concepts in the history of philosophy 
of science is not straightforward. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
framework function not only as core explanatory components (explanans) but also as the targets 
of explanation (explananda).  In more recent work, law-like regularities among properties are 
considered to be a kind of explanation in their own right. For instance, Bird (1998) calls them 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? inference to 
the best explanation (IBE), a common form of scientific reasoning.   
 
 The task in this paper is not to articulate the distinctions between laws and explanations 
from a philosophical perspective. Indeed, as educators, it is beyond the scope of our engagement 
in philosophy of science to contribute to or resolve existing debates or to generate new knowledge 
in the field. This task is left to the professional philosophers. Rather, the purpose of this analysis 
is to draw out some themes around laws and explanations, discussed in philosophy of biology and 
philosophy of chemistry, in ways that are relevant for science education. For example, ?????????
laws and the Periodic Law are chosen as examples because of their prominence in science 
curricula at secondary school level, which is our primary area of interest. At times, the discussion 
will refer to some contentious characterisations of laws and explanations. Again, here the 
discussion is reflecting ongoing debates to inform the science education community of the sorts of 
issues that are of concern to philosophers of science. The implications for science education could 
include problematizing the nature of laws, explanations or indeed the contrast itself. However, 
given the typically separate reference to laws and explanations in the science curricula, the goal in 
this chapter is to interrogate the existing literatures for particular and explicit references to either 
laws or explanations thus informing subsequent analysis of how they are depicted in science 
education. 
 
 Furthermore, while discussions of NOS in the science education literature typically focus 
on the relationship between laws and theories (specifically on how they are different), they tend to 
neglect the conceptual disciplinary-based features that pertain to them.  Shifting the discussion in 
this paper from laws and theories to laws and explanations underscores the following key 
ideas/assumptions:  1) Explanation is a key purpose of science. Theories are developed not as 
ends in themselves but as powerful explanatory and predictive tools, 2) Laws express regularities 
that can serve predictive and/or explanatory functions, 3) Explanations are building blocks of 
scientific theories that can be explored pedagogically at multiple organisational levels, and 4) 
Explanations are pragmatic and contextual (de Regt 2011).  
 
 Focusing on explanations rather than theories in this paper, allows for a nuanced and 
contextual discussion of their characteristics across disciplines and sub-disciplines from 
philosophical and educational perspectives. The significance of explanations in science 
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curriculum and instruction is recognised by science educators in a variety of ways. In some cases, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????stration 
of the lack of consistency between the terms ?explain? and ?describe? in teaching materials and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
teleological explanations with causal explanations. At the level of instruction, teachers are 
reported to use a wide range of explanatory types some of which are scientific and some are not, 
calling for further examination of the appropriateness of these explanations (Dagher & Cossman 
1992). More recent work presents evidence for the difficulties experienced by students in 
generating and justifying scientific explanations (Sandoval & Millwood 2005). In addition, there 
have been ongoing efforts focused on designing instructional models for supporting student 
development of scientific explanations (Land & Zembal-Saul 2003, McNeill et al. 2006, McNeill 
& Krajcik 2012). 
 
 In summary, the purpose of this chapter is to discuss characterisations of laws and 
explanations in biology and chemistry, and extract some implications for teaching, learning, and 
curriculum. The goal is to demonstrate how some of the ongoing debates about the nature of laws 
and explanations in biology and chemistry can have useful contributions to teaching these 
disciplines without necessarily resolving these debates.  Exploring the arguments in these debates 
allows the articulation of how laws and explanations as products of scientific knowledge might be 
addressed more meaningfully in educational settings by discussing current coverage of laws and 
explanations in typical biology and chemistry textbooks. The chapter concludes with 
recommendations for revising textbooks and instruction in ways that restore the grounding of 
subject matter knowledge in its epistemological context. 
 
2  The Nature of Laws and Explanations in Science    
 
Volumes have been written about the nature of laws and explanations in science, mostly using 
physics as a basis for analysis. Views about the purpose and nature of these entities have changed 
over time and some aspects of them continue to undergo some debate. Attempting to summarise 
this vast literature or represent the diversity of views in few paragraphs is impossible without 
doing grave injustice to the field.  It is necessary, however, to highlight key ideas before 
discussing the characteristics of laws and explanations in biology and chemistry with the 
understanding that this brief overview is not exhaustive or representative of extant viewpoints. 
 
 What distinguishes a law of nature from any other regularity?  Traditional definitions of a 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
bases. Lange (2005) argues that the condition of truth alone does not help make this distinction 
since other regularities are true also.  He proposes the following four criteria to aid in 
distinguishing laws of nature from other regularities: necessity, counterfactuals, explanatory 
power, and inductive confirmations. Mahner & Bunge (1997) have argued that laws are said to be 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. 
?????????????critique of ??????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????? 
????????????????????????????????????????. Giere (1999) on the other hand holds the view that what 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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conceptualisations first proposed in the Enlightenment. He proposes the consideration of models, 
which he argues are more reflective of how science is actually practiced. 
 
 The significance of the debates about the nature of scientific laws becomes most relevant 
when discussing the role they play in supporting explanations in the specific sciences.  
Attempting a balanced description of scientific laws is a complex undertaking considering debates 
among philosophers about criteria invoked to distinguish between various types of laws such as 
strict versus ceteris paribus laws, empirical versus a priori laws. Such criteria include 
mathematical models, necessity, and explanatory and predictive potential. Some of these debates 
will be revisited in the context of the specific sciences later in this chapter. 
     
 In an insightful paper written more than five decades ago, Bunge (1961) classified lawlike 
statements from various philosophical standpoints into more than seven-dozen kinds. He 
concluded his detailed analysis with calling for less stringent philosophical restrictions regarding 
what could be classified as a law: 
 
There are as many classifications of law statements as viewpoints can be profitably 
adopted in their regard, and there seems to be no reason?save certain philosophical 
traditions?why most law statements should be regarded as nonlaw statements merely 
because they fail to comply with either certainty, or strict universality, or causality, or 
simplicity, or any other requisite found necessary in the past, where science seemed to 
concern itself exclu???????????????????????a posteriori and general in some respect) 
statements be required corroboration and systematicity in order to be ranked as law 
statements, seems to fit contemporary usage in the sciences. (Bunge 1961, p. 281). 
 
 ?????????????????????? regarding what constitutes scientific laws is a profound one. 
Continued debates about what counts as a scientific law, argued with core propositions of 
particular science disciplines, seem to be fundamentally grounded in normative or pragmatic 
standpoints and from this perspective cannot said to have been fully resolved.  Perhaps the most 
valuable context for such debates has been relative to the role of laws in generating or supporting 
scientific explanations (Press 2009). 
  
 Explanation is often hailed as one of the main goals of the scientific enterprise. Nagel 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
explanations which are at once systematic and controllable by factual evidence that generates 
science; and it is the classification and organisation of knowledge on the basis of explanatory 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 4).  While this stance towards 
explanation may seem obvious, it does not represent a united or a longstanding view. Logical 
positivists for instance, led by Ernest Mach, held that the aim of science is not to explain but 
rather to describe and predict phenomena (de Regt 2011).  Discussions of the components that 
distinguish scientific explanation from other forms of explanation have spurred significant 
philosophical debate and led to a variety of accounts that have expanded understanding of their 
diversity.  
 
The following discussion focuses on describing three main families or models of 
explanation. These are: nomological explanation, causal explanation, and functional explanation. 
According to de Regt (2011), these models are not mutually exclusive but can be used to explain 
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the same phenomenon or explain phenomena in different disciplines.  
 
The Deductive-Nomological (D-N) or Covering Law model of explanation proposed by 
Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) frames explanation as a logical argument in which the 
conclusion, or explanandum follows from a set of premises, or explanans. The premises that 
constitute the explanans have to include at least one general law and other relevant preconditions. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????n process and has to be 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
One of the unresolved issues in the D-N model of explanation, pointed out by de Regt (2011), is 
that science is usually concerned with the explanation of laws, which necessitates the use of other 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-statistical 
explanation (I-S), in which the law used in the explanans contains high probability that 
subsequently gives rise to an inductive (as opposed to deductive) support to the explanandum.  
 
The Causal Mechanical (CM) model of explanation moves away from the conception of 
explanation as an argument (Salmon 1984). In generating this model, Salmon abandoned the 
attempt to characterise explanation or causal relationships in purely statistical terms. The CM 
model employs several central ideas. A causal process is a physical process, like the movement of 
a ball through space, that is characterised by the ability to transmit a mark in a continuous way.  A  
mark is some local modification to the structure of a process. A process is capable of transmitting 
a mark if, once the mark is introduced at one spatio-temporal location, it will persist to other 
spatio-temporal locations even in the absence of any further interaction.  
 
Causal processes contrast with pseudo-processes that lack the ability to transmit marks. 
An example is the shadow of a moving physical object. The other major element in Salmon's 
model is the notion of a causal interaction. A casual interaction involves a spatio-temporal 
intersection between two causal processes which modifies the structure of both?each process 
comes to have features it would not have had in the absence of the interaction. A collision 
between two cars that dents both is a paradigmatic causal interaction. According to the CM 
model, an explanation of some event E will trace the causal processes and interactions leading up 
to E (Salmon calls this the etiological aspect of the explanation), or at least some portion of these, 
as well as describing the processes and interactions that make up the event itself (the constitutive 
aspect of explanation). In this way, the explanation shows how E ???????????????????????????? 
(Salmon 1984, p. 9).  
 
?????????????????????????????????????????????r the role or presence of a component item 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
components of which contribute to the working of the system (organisms, human minds, societies 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
explanations: The good-consequence doctrine in which the function confers some good on 
something or someone, the goal doctrine in which the function contributed to a goal that 
something, its designer, or its user has, and the explanation doctrine in which the function 
includes causes or reasons or consequences. These categories probably make it easier to 
differentiate between functional explanations with teleological goal-oriented tendencies (the 
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second doctrine) and other functional explanations.  Achinstein further distinguishes between 
three types of functions: design functions, use-functions, and service-functions, allowing for a 
more nuanced and contextual differentiation between different functional explanations.  
 
 Philosophers of science have discussed a plethora of explanation models3. Additional 
contributions have came from philosophers of biology (e.g. Rosenberg & McShea, 2008, 
Schaffner, 1993, Sober 2008) and philosophers of chemistry (e.g. Goodwin 2008, Scerri & 
McIntyre 1997, van Brakel 2000) presenting and defending explanatory models that communicate 
the uniqueness of their disciplines. The following section describes the characteristics of laws and 
explanations in biology and chemistry focusing on aspects that have direct implications for 
science education.  
 
3 The Nature of Laws and Explanations in Biology and Chemist ry 
  
3.1 Laws in Biology 
 
There has been considerable discussion among philosophers regarding the appropriateness or 
meaningfulness of the concept of law in biology. Mayr takes the stance that ?laws play a rather 
small role in theory construction in biology?? He ?????????????????to the greater role played in 
biological systems by chance and randomness. Other reasons for the small role of laws in biology 
are the uniqueness of a high percentage of phenomena in living systems as well as the historical 
nature of events? (Mayr 2004, p. 28).  ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
them distinct from those pertaining to physical systems. (Mayr 2004, p. 30). For Mayr, the matter 
is not one of nomenclature but one of substance. He concedes that even though some of the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????.   
 
 G????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????
have strict mathematical laws of its own. There are, as in any science, generalisations. But these 
generalisations have a habit of proving to be: (i) not distinctive to biology; (ii) not strict, 
exceptionless, mathematical laws; or (iii) not laws at all. Put in more positive terms, the 
generalisations found in biology are: (i) laws that belong to other sciences, (ii) ceteris paribus 
laws4??????????????????????????????????? 157-158).  Others such as Uzman (2006) maintain that some 
biological observations tend to be presented as theories at a time when they should be considered 
laws of nature. He identifies four laws: The First law: all phenomena of life are consistent with 
the laws of chemistry and physics; Second law: The cell is the fundamental unit of life. Third law: 
Life is continuous across generations. Fourth law: Life evolves ? populations change genetically 
and irreversibly through time.  Örstan (2007) attributes to E. O. Wilson the claim that biology has 
?? ????????????????????????. All of the phenomena of biology are ultimately obedient to the laws 
of physics and chemistry, and 2. All of the phenomena of biology have arisen by evolution 
                                               
3 For example see Giere (1988), Harré (1988), Hesse (1970), Pitt (1988), Salmon (1987), and Scriven 
(1970). 
4 The Latin ceteris paribus ??????????????????????????????????????ceteris paribus laws are laws that have 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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????????????????????????????? It can be argued, using Garvey???????????? that even these ?laws? 
constitute generalisations that are non-mathematical and/or true by definition. 
 
 Reasons advanced in support or opposition to the concept of laws in biology can be found 
in various sub-disciplines (evolutionary biology; systems biology; molecular biology; ecology). 
While the complexity of biological systems is widely acknowledged, constant efforts are being 
undertaken to establish fundamental biological organising principles that exhibit lawlikeness. For 
example, Dhar and Guiliani (2010) present an approach for uncovering fundamental organising 
principles in systems biology. Dodds (2009) has identified 36 laws in ecology to minimise the 
perceived complexity in interpreting ecological systems. McShea and Brandon (2010) recently 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
what Ne??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
contingencies inherent in biological systems have not discouraged biologists and philosophers of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????sin??????????????? 
 
 To attain the ideal status of a universal law, Dhar and Guiliani (2010) believe that what 
biologists need to do but is difficult to attain, is to construct generalisations that connect all levels 
from atoms to ecosystems. From their persp???????? ??????????????????????????????????
framework at the phenotypic level, but an equivalent framework is absent at the cell-cell level. 
They believe, however, that just because this framework is currently absent does not mean it is 
not attainable in principle. Thus they are optimistic about the possibility of finding powerful 
generalisations at the different levels of organisation (Dhar & Guiliani 2010) or developing 
empirical biological laws (Elgin 2006). In Elgin?? (2006) view, a ????????????????????????????????s 
????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????-biological concepts in it must be 
mathematical, (2) It must contain at least some biological concepts and these concepts must be 
??????????????????????? (Elgin 2006, p. 130). 
 
 Other philos??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
norm with an account of the use ??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????? 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????practice. As a 
consequence, the traditional understanding of laws is incomplete and fails to account for how 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????
characterises the reasons used to deny the existence of laws in biology as rooted in a normative 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(Mitchell 1997, p. S473). Arguing against the privileging of a very special type of generalisation 
that meets very stringen???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
contingency of generalizations in biology or other sciences does not preclude their functioning as 
??????-- generalizations that ground and inform expectations in a variety of conte???????????????
1997, p. S478).    
 
 ??????????????of segregation and independent assortment are popular topics for debating 
the nature of biological laws. Briefly stated,  
 
Mendel's first law, the Law of Segregation, states that while an organism may 
contain a pair of contrasting alleles, e.g. Tt, these will segregate (separate) during 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
or t (but not both or neither). Mendel's second law, the Law of Independent 
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Assortment, states that the segregation of alleles for one character is completely 
random with respect to the segregation of alleles for other characters. (Dictionary 
of Botany 2003). 
 
However, neither their highly contingent nature (Mitchell 2009) nor the historical ambiguity 
surrounding their ascendance from principles to laws (see Footnote 2 and Marks 2008) are 
adequate reasons for demoting them to accidental generalisations.  Rather than deny the existence 
of biological laws, it is more useful in the context of the variation inherent in biological systems 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????  
 
3.1.1 ???????????? ?????????????????????????????????   
 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????-plant 
experiments. Inheritance is a classic topic in middle and high school biology curriculum 
materials. A typical chapter in one high school biology book (BSCS 2003) begins with getting 
students to consider similarities of features between members of different generations in families. 
Starting with discussions about familiar experiences the chapter invites students to read the tragic 
case of hemophilia in the family of the last Czars, then leads them to work on different scenarios 
in order to predict inheritance patterns. Next, students are engaged in simulations, using beans, to 
help them understand the inheritance of one and two traits. The chapter explores inherited 
patterns, defines gametes, describes meiosis, tracks genes and chromosomes through meiosis by 
guiding students to construct a physical representation that tracks the genotype of the newly 
????????????????????addresses the role of sample size in leading to more accurate predictions. Next 
the book introduces Gregor Mendel and a video segment that provides data for students to use to 
make predictions then compare their predictions with actual results provided by the teacher. 
Additional exercises pertaining to linked and sex-linked traits are offered to deepen and elaborate 
the concepts before the chapter ends with a discussion of the genetic basis for human variation. 
 
 Of part????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
you follow the inheritance of 2 traits (a di-hybrid cross), more complex patterns result. In garden 
peas, the genes for the traits of pod color and pod shape are on different chromosomes. As a 
?????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????BSCS 2003, p. 
438). The only other significant reference to this law appears later in the book in an essay at the 
end of the unit. The essay discusses the concepts of phenotype and genotype, and concludes with 
an example that demonstrates the random inheritance of traits demonstrating how a baby rabbit 
may inherit different genes for particular traits from the father and mother like fur color and eye 
color independently of each other. The essay concludes with the following historical narrative: 
 
The principle of independent assortment was discovered more than 150 years ago in 
a small European monastery garden. A scholarly monk named Gregor Mendel used 
pea plants to study patterns of inheritance. Mendel experimented with many 
generations of pea plants. His insights alter became the cornerstone for explaining 
basic patterns of inheritance. (BSCS 2003, p. 499)   
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 As seen in these excerpts, the same concept is referred to as a law in one section of the 
book and as principle in another. It is not clear whether the shift in language is accidental or 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????idea5. While inconsistency in how textbook authors use 
categorisations of scientific knowledge has been already documented (e.g. McComas 2003), 
noting this inconsistency in this paper underscores what appears to be confusion or lack of clarity 
about the purpose that this law/principle serves, as demonstrated in both excerpts. The textbook 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? independent assortment entails or 
the role it plays in explaining phenomena. It is stated casually as a claim that explains some 
observations, no different than another claim in terms of its generalisability (or lack thereof), or 
ability to explain or predict. It is not made explicitly clear that this generalisation can be used to 
explain or predict phenotypes and genotypes of new generations of siblings that go beyond the 
specifics of the examples discussed in the chapter. 
 
 The main issues in the examples quoted earlier are: 1) the striking lack of clarification 
about what a law entails, 2) the unexplained switch from ?law? in the chapter to ?principle? in the 
historical anecdote, 3) lack of explicit reference to the relative strong explanatory power 
(Woodward 2001) expressed that is qualitatively and quantitatively different from other concepts 
presented in the textbook.   
 
 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
devoid of references to laws or principles. Some 60 pages after describing the historical work of 
Mendel, and only in the context of discussing genes and chromosomes, there is a brief reference 
?????????? ?????????????? 
 
When the chromosomes line up before division, the paternal and maternal 
chromosomes in the pair line up randomly and separate independently of each 
other. This is called independent segregation of the chromosomes. Independent 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????
law of independent assortment. It also accounts for the fact that genes that are 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ? 
(SEPUP 2010, p. 356).  
 
 ????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
explanatory function. But ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
in both textbooks either reflects a general trend of accidental nature, or an outcome o???????????
awareness of the philosophical controversy about laws in biology. In both cases, avoidance of 
                                               
5 ?????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????? 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????The Physical Basis of Heredity.
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explication of the significance of laws or principles in biology in the context of a specific content, 
such as the one explored here, reduces the likelihood that students will understand the usefulness 
of this aspect of scientific knowledge relative to its explanatory function.  One way to rectify this 
matter is by using language consistently in textbooks, clarifying what the referents mean, and 
educating teachers about the distinctive nature of laws in biology, noting their relevance to 
explaining observations and predicting new ones. Alternatively, teachers can problematize terms 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? addresses their meaning 
and significance. 
 
3.2  Laws in Chemistry 
 
Until fairly recently, the status of laws in chemistry has received little attention within philosophy 
of science (e.g. Cartwright 1983). With the upsurge of philosophy of chemistry in the 1990s, there 
has been more focus on what might (or not) make laws distinctly chemical in nature. Some 
philosophers of chemistry (e.g. Christie & Christie 2000) as well as chemical educators (e.g. 
Erduran 2007) have argued that there are particular aspects of laws in chemistry that differentiate 
them from laws in other branches of science with implications for teaching and learning in the 
science classroom. A topic of particular centrality and relevance for chemical education is the 
???????????????????????? which is typically uncharacterised as such: 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
in terms of the Periodic Table, and little or no mention is made of the periodic law. 
This leads too easily to the view (a false view, we would submit), that the Periodic 
Table is a sort of taxonomic scheme: a scheme that was very useful for nineteenth 
century chemists, but had no theoretical grounding until quantum mechanics, and 
notions of electronic structure came along. (Christie & Christie 2003, p. 170)  
 
 A ?law? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(i.e. Equal volumes of gases under identical temperature and pressure conditions will contain 
equal numbers of particles) are quantitative in nature whilst others are not. For example, laws of 
stoichiometry are quantitative in nature and count as laws in a strong sense. Others rely more on 
approximations and are difficult to specify in an algebraic fashion. As a key contributor to 
philosophy of chemistry, Eric Scerri (2000a) takes the position that some laws of chemistry are 
fundamentally different from laws in physics (Scerri 2000a). Whilst the emphasis in physics is on 
mathematisation, some chemistry laws take on an approximate nature: 
 
The periodic law of the elements, for example, differs from typical laws in physics in 
that the recurrence of elements after certain intervals is only approximate. In addition, 
the repeat period varies as one progresses through the periodic system. These features 
do not render the periodic law any less lawlike, but they do suggest that the nature of 
laws may differ from one area of science to another. (Scerri 2000a, p. 523) 
 
 Viewed from the perspective of physics, the status of the periodic system may appear to 
be far from law-like (Scerri & McIntyre 1997). Significantly, the periodic law seems not to be 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
expressed, the Periodic Law states that there exists a periodicity in the properties of the elements 
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governed by certain intervals within their sequence arranged according to their atomic numbers.  
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
chemical periodicity is approximate. For example, the elements sodium and potassium represent a 
repetition of the element lithium, which lies at the head of group I of the periodic table, but these 
three elements are not identical. Indeed, a vast amount of chemical knowledge is gathered by 
studying patterns of variation that occur within vertical columns or groups in the periodic table. 
Predictions which are made from the so called periodic law do not follow deductively from a 
theory in the same way in which idealised predictions flow almost inevitably from physical laws, 
together with the assumption of certain initial conditions. 
 
 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????vitation have had 
success in terms of their predictive power, the Periodic Law is not axiomatised in mathematical 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
chemists versus physicists. Chemists are interested in documenting some of the trends in the 
chemical properties of elements in the periodic system that cannot be predicted even from 
accounts that are available through contributions of quantum mechanics to chemistry.  Christie 
and Christie (2000), on the other hand, argue that the laws of chemistry are fundamentally 
different from the laws of physics because they describe fundamentally different kinds of physical 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
which are universally true. However the Periodic Law consists of many exceptions in terms of the 
regularities demonstrated in the properties and behaviours of elements. Yet, for the chemist there 
is a certain idealisation about how, for the most part, elements will behave under particular 
conditions.  In contrast to Scerri (2000a) and Christie and Christie (2000), Vihalemm (2003) 
argues that all laws need to be treated homogeneously because all laws are idealisations regardless 
of whether or not they can be axiomatised. van Brakel further questions the assumptions about the 
????????????????????????????????? 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
standard assumption has been that there are strict laws in physics, but that assumption is 
possibly mistaken . . . Perhaps chemistry may yet provide a more realistic illustration of 
an empirical science than physics has hitherto done. (van Brakel 1999, p. 141). 
 
 Christie and Christie (2000) indicate that taking physics as a paradigmatic science, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
proposition that (1) was universally quantified, (2) was true, (3) was contingent, and (4) contained 
only non-????????????????????????????(p. 35). These authors further argue that such a physics-
based account is too narrow and apply only to simple systems. More complex empirical sciences 
do not necessarily conform to such accounts of laws: 
 
The peculiar character of chemical laws and theories is not specific to chemistry. 
Interesting parallels may be found with laws and theories in other branches of science 
that deal with complex systems and that stand in similar relations to physics as does 
chemistry. Materials science, geophysics, and meteorology are examples of such fields. 
(Christie & Christie 2000, p. 36). 
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The debates around the nature of laws in chemistry are ongoing and it is beyond the scope 
of this paper to contribute to this debate. However, it is important to problematise the complexity 
in the ways that philosophers of chemistry dispute the nature of chemical knowledge at large and 
the nature of laws in particular. 
 
In summary, the suggestion offered by Christie (1994) is considered useful: 
 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
all of the very diverse dicta that scientists have chosen to regard as laws of their various 
branches of science. If this is done, we will find that there is not a particular character 
that one can associate with a law of nature. (Christie 1994, p. 629) 
 
3.2.1 The Case of Periodic Law in Chemistry Textbooks   
 
This section describes a case study of how a typical textbook covers the Periodic Table and how 
the discussion on the nature of the Periodic Law from a philosophical perspective could inform 
textbook revision. The purpose of this example is to illustrate how the philosophical dimensions 
of chemistry can be better captured in textbooks so as to ensure understanding of the 
epistemological aspects of chemistry. The coverage of the Periodic Table in chemistry textbooks 
has been highlighted to be problematic from a range of perspectives. For instance, Brito and 
colleagues (2005) argue that the important distinction of accommodation versus prediction in the 
context of Periodic Table is not covered in chemistry textbooks. In A Natural Approach to 
Chemistry, a textbook that is in current use in secondary schools in the USA, Hsu and associates 
(2010) dedicate a whole 31-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
begins with a section on the origin of elements in the universe. There are numerous occasions 
where the discussion on elements is linked to everyday contexts including the nature of metals on 
the hull of a boat, the human body and nutrition. A significant portion of the chapter is dedicated 
to the discussion on electronegativity, ionisation energy, the groups and series in the periodic 
table and an explanation of why compounds form using the Lewis dot notation. The chapter 
concludes with a set of open ended and multiple-choice questions. 
 
 The coverage of the Periodic Table does mention the notion of patterns but not laws. In 
the section describing the development of the Periodic Table and the contributions of Dimitri 
Mendeleev, the authors state that he ?????????????????????????????????????s any kind of 
organisation to the elements, some kind of pattern he could use to help organize them in a logical 
way.?????????????????????????????????????????????the earlier discussion about the approximate nature 
of the Periodic Law. Indeed, predictions which are made from the so called Periodic Law do not 
follow deductively from a theory in the same way in which idealised predictions flow almost 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
be misleading in communicating the approximate nature of periodicity. The characterisation of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? by repeated patterns found 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????(p. 171). The explanation of the 
Periodic Table in terms of the atomic theory further stresses the logical ordering that the authors 
are emphasising throughout the text. In the discussion on the Modern Periodic Table, the authors 
state the following: 
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At the time of Mendeleev, nothing was known about the internal structure of atoms. 
Protons were not yet discovered so the more logical ordering by atomic number was not 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
but by atomic number. However two things are still true of the periodic table, each 
column represents a group of elements with similar chemical properties, and each row (or 
period) marks the beginning of some repeated pattern of physical and chemical 
properties. While elements can be broadly categorized into metals, non-metals, and 
metalloids, an understanding that each column has similar chemical properties had lead to 
names for some of these element groups. (Hsu et al. 2010, p. 175) 
 
 What follows is the quantum mechanical models and the use of orbitals in explaining the 
organisation of the groups of elements. Considerable discussion is dedicated to establishing the 
role of valency in explaining periodicity including the introduction of the Lewis dot diagrams. 
The coverage of this textbook in terms of the viewing the Periodic Table as a taxonomical tool 
and a scheme without any explicit emphasis on the character of periodicity as a law-like feature of 
chemistry is consistent with observations of Christie and Christie (2003) mentioned earlier. 
 
 In his critique of Atkins? chemistry textbook coverage of quantum mechanical 
explanations, Scerri (1999) highlights a tendency among chemistry textbook writers to ignore the 
irregularities in the patterns in the Periodic Table:  
 
One is tempted to protest that in fact the proffered explanation does indeed require a 
new principle, namely the strange notion whereby the d- and f-subshells do not need 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
have detracted from the triumph of science to admit at this point, or anywhere in the 
book, that the assignment of electrons to particular orbitals is an approximation. In 
fact, Atkins could have made his story of the Periodic Kingdom all the more 
interesting if he had stated that even though his discussion was based around an 
approximate concept, we are still able to use it to remarkable effect to explain so many 
macroscopic and microscopic features connected with trends in the periodic table. 
(Scerri 1999, p. 302). 
 
 When the textbooks do cover the peculiarities, they are left un-discussed, as exemplified 
in the textbook mentioned earlier. Consider, for instance, the following excerpt: 
 
The transition metals illustrate a peculiar fact: the 3d orbitals have higher energy than 
the 4s orbitals!/../ Energy is the real, physical quantity that determines how the 
electrons act in atoms. The real energy levels correspond to the rows of the periodic 
table. The quantum number is an important mathematical construction, but is not the 
same as the energy level. (Hsu et al. 2010, p. 179).  
 
Here there is a missed opportunity to raise some philosophical insights into the role of empirical 
evidence in model building in contrast to the mathematical and theoretical grounds for quantum 
mechanical models in chemistry. Scerri highlights this issue by inviting textbook writers to 
consider the grounds on which orbital models are related to periodicity: 
 
In addition, the failure to provide an adequate explanation of the 4s/3d question or a 
deductive explanation of the precise places where the elements a?????????????????
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should give us and Atkins grounds for suspecting that this model is not even all that 
empirically adequate. (Scerri 1999, p. 303) 
 
 So what would a revised chemistry textbook look like in light of this discussion so far? 
There are at least two issues that this coverage of the nature of the Periodic Law raises for 
consideration in textbook writing. First, the textbooks should elicit the approximate nature of the 
Periodic Law and specify the reference to the patterns in periodicity as an instance of law while 
highlighting the difference of interpretations of law in different branches of science. Second, the 
juxtaposition of the empirical versus theoretical dimensions of the orbital models should be teased 
out to clarify the different epistemological status of the Periodic Table in light of its historical and 
empirical foundation versus the incorporation of theoretical and mathematical characterisations 
since the advance of quantum mechanical models. Erduran (2007) has proposed elsewhere that an 
argumentation framework could offer a useful pedagogical strategy for eliciting different 
characterisations of laws (Erduran 2007) and suggested a potential activity could be structured as 
follows: 
 
Claim 1:  The periodic law and the law of gravitation ????????????????????????????????????????????
be used with the same meaning for both of them. 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
cannot be used with the same meaning for both of them. 
 
 These claims could be presented with evidence that would support either claim, both or 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????s???????????????????????????claims while 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ravitation can 
??????????????????????????????claim. The task for the students would be to argue for either claim 
and justify their reasoning. Further statements can be developed that would act as evidence for 
either, both or neither claim.  
 
 The inclusion of a framework that simulates the philosophical debate on the nature of laws 
in a comparative context between physics and chemistry will carry into the classroom the ways in 
which philosophers have conceptualised the nature of this particular aspect of scientific 
???????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of science that projects a perception of a consensus when there is none. In summary, the inclusion 
of meta-perspectives offered by philosophical accounts of laws can provide insights into textbook 
accounts of laws whereby the particular nuances of chemical knowledge are better framed in 
terms of consistency with epistemological accounts on chemical knowledge. 
 
4  The Nature of Explanation in Biology and Chemist ry 
 
4.1  Explanation in Biology 
 
Explanation in biology differs from explanation in physics in that it does not aim to provide the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
but ever increasing insights into the causal workings of various life processes??????????????????????
?????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a basic dichotomy between at least two ways of explaining biological systems. In asking about 
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how a phenomenon happens, the proximate explanation would address physiological or other 
processes that underlie the cause, while the ultimate explanation would address the phenomenon 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????lanations do not contradict but rather 
complement each other by adding a different dimension: one causal and another historical.  
 
 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Sterelny & Griffiths 1999) four explanatory projects in biology, according to which it is possible 
to address questions about any behavior by proposing 4 different explanations: proximal, 
developmental, adaptive, and evolutionary.   
 
Tinbergen distinguished four questions we could have in mind in asking why a bittern 
stands still with its bill pointed directly at the sky. (1) We could be asking for a 
proximal explanation: an explanation of the hormonal and neural mechanisms involved 
in triggering and controlling this behavior. (2) We could be asking for a developmental 
explanation: an explanation of how this behavior pattern emerges in a young bittern. (3) 
We could be asking for an adaptive explanation: an account, that is, of the role this 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
explanation of how and why this behavior evolved in this bittern and in its ancestors.  
(Sterelny & Griffiths 1999, p. 50). 
  
 Press (2009) suggests that one of the ways in which philosophers contrast physics and 
biology is by appealing to differences between their respective explanations as they relate to the 
covering law model. He describes divergent views among philosophers of biology, as represented 
by Sober, Kitcher and Rosenberg regarding the applicability of the covering-law model in the 
context of biological explanations. After analyzing the different positions, Press (2009) concludes  
that there is a good fit bet????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, stating 
that ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????vily on 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 Branching off of these distinctions, philosophers of biology have detailed a number of 
explanatory types that support the aim of gaining insights about ?????????????????????????
biological systems without limiting their discussion to causal explanations. Wouters (1995), for 
example, outlines five different types of explanation: Physiological, Capacity, Developmental, 
Viability, and Historical/Evolutionary. These different types of explanation approach the same 
phenomena from different perspectives. To explain the circulatory system of a given organism for 
example, Wouters argues that physiological explanations focus on the types of events in the 
individual ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
explanations having to do with the structure of the heart and valves. A developmental explanation 
would focus on the development of the system (heart and vessels), while a viability explanation 
would focus on why structural differences between systems occur in different organisms. Finally, 
an evolutionary explanation would focus on differences in systems between organisms in the 
same lineage.   
 
 More recently, Wouters (2007) has proposed a sixth type, design explanation, in which a 
system in a real organism might be compared to a hypothetical one. Calcott (2009) makes the case 
for an additional type of explanation that he names, lineage explanation. This type of explanation 
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aims to make plausible a series of incremental changes that lead to evolutionary change, focusing 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
how small changes between ancestral and derived mechanisms could have produced different 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????account for evolutionary change. 
 
 Rose (2004) offers a fable that supports the discussion of how biological systems can 
sustain a variety of explanations.  In this fable, five biologists are having a picnic when they 
noticed a frog jump into a nearby pond. Posing the question of what caused it to do so, led to five 
different answers. The physiologist reasoned that impulses traveled from its retina to the brain and 
then to the leg muscles. The biochemist pointed out the properties of the proteins, actin and 
myosin, whose fibrous nature enable them to move in a predictable way. The developmental 
biologist attributed it to the ontogenetic processes that occurred during early stages of cell 
division. The animal behaviorist attributed the cause to the snake that was lurking by, whereas the 
evolutionist discussed the role of natural selection in favoring those frogs that escaped their prey 
due their ability to detect them quickly and move fast in response, allowing them to survive and 
reproduce. 
 
 Of course, the question of legitimacy of teleological explanation in biology is important 
because of historical and pedagogical reasons. This is because attributing purpose to non-
purposeful things or events, or attributing human qualities to non-humans can lead to questioning 
the credibility of the proposed explanation. The human tendency to assign purpose to everything 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
these explanations likely to be misunderstood by non-experts, especially in educational settings. 
Some philosophers of biology differ in their degree of opposition to the use of these explanations 
but not necessarily to their problematic content?perhaps because they are well aware of their 
semantic affordances and limitations. Few philosophers strongly object to their use as expressed 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????
(which it is) but because it is a straightjacket for the mind, restricting truly creative scientific 
??????????????????? 
 
 The philosophical debates around these ideas have implications for educational settings 
but empirical findings can assist in making informed judgments regarding their use in educational 
contexts. Some science educators have cautioned against the use of anthropomorphic and 
teleological explanations in biology teaching out of concern for engendering misconceptions that 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????garding teleological and anthropomorphic explanations, arguing that results of an 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????of anthropomorphic or 
teleological explanations is not indicative of teleological reasoning, but seem to serve a heuristic 
value for learning as gleaned ?????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????? 
 
 The range of explanations described by Wouters (1995, 2007), Calcott (2009), and Rose 
(2004) illustrates the significance of invoking a diverse set of explanations for providing more 
comprehensive understanding of biological systems. Perhaps one of the overarching attributes of 
biological explanations is the notion of consilience in which different explanations need not be 
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subsumed under one another and need not contradict with one another. The notion of consilience 
attributed to Wilson by Rose (2004), can perhaps be viewed as a pragmatic adaptation of the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????Novum Organun Renovatum 
(Morrison 2000). The diversity of explanatory types in biology is perhaps reflective of the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
systems. This diversity is often obscured in biology education, not because it is difficult to 
communicate, but mostly due to the way the school biology curriculum is chopped up and 
structured in ways that limit reference at a given point in time to one or two explanatory 
emphases. This in turn ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
epistemological pluralism as a powerful vehicle for explaining and understanding phenomena in 
the life sciences. 
 
4.1.1  Explanation in Biology Textbooks 
 
Topics typically covered in high school biology textbooks in the United States include evolution, 
genetics, cell biology, and ecology. The approach to explicating these topics and the order in 
which they are presented varies significantly from one publisher to another6.  For example in the 
SEPUP (2011) book, the ecology unit, typically presented in other books as the last unit, is second 
to a first unit on sustainability, a topic rarely addressed so explicitly in biology textbooks. 
However, explanations in the three textbooks consulted (see footnote) are similar to one another 
in that they are not differentiated from the rest of the text, but are blended in the narrative, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
discernible attempt to provide a broader synthesis, weave cross-topical themes, or illustrate the 
notion of explanatory consilience. 
 
4.2  Explanation in Chemistry 
 
In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Weisberg and colleagues (2011) review the recent 
developments in the formulation of chemical explanations. These authors state that from the 19th 
century onwards, chemistry was commonly taught and studied with physical models of molecular 
structure. Beginning in the 20th century, mathematical models based on classical and quantum 
mechanics were applied to chemical systems. The use of molecular models has helped chemists to 
understand the significance of molecular shape (Brock 2000) and aided visual representation of 
structure and function of matter. One of the key scientific achievements of the twentieth century, 
the discovery of the double helical structure of DNA, was possible because of the use of physical 
models as explanatory tools (Watson 1968). The focus of chemical explanations entered a new 
phase with the advent of quantum mechanical theories and their applications in chemistry. The 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
also philosophical themes such as supervenience and reduction (Earley 2003) which will be 
referenced briefly later in the paper. 
 
 According to Weisberg and colleagues (2011), while exact solutions to the quantum 
mechanical descriptions of chemical phenomena have not been achieved, advances in theoretical 
physics, applied mathematics, and computation have made it possible to calculate the chemical 
                                               
6 The three textbooks reviewed in this section are BSCS 2003, Campbell, Reese, Taylor, Simon & Dickey 2009, and 
SEPUP 2011. 
 
 
19 
properties of many molecules very accurately and with few idealisations. This perspective is in 
contrast to those chemists who argue for employing simple, more highly idealised models in 
chemistry, which stems from the explanatory traditions of chemistry. In developing this point, 
Hoffmann illustrates two modes of explanation that can be directed at chemical systems: 
horizontal and vertical (Hoffmann 1998). Vertical explanations are what philosophers of science 
???????????????-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
occurrence from quantum mechanics. Calculations in quantum chemistry are often used to make 
predictions, but insofar as they are taken to explain chemical phenomena, they follow this pattern. 
By showing that a molecular structure is stable, the quantum chemist is reasoning that this 
structure was to be expected given the underlying physics. 
 
 In contrast to the vertical mode, the horizontal mode of explanation attempts to explain 
chemical phenomena with chemical concepts. For example, Weisberg and colleagues (2011) use 
the example of SN2 reactions as an example of horizontal explanations. The first year organic 
chemistry curricula include the relative reaction rates of different substrates undergoing SN2 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
SN2 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ving group Br? is a weaker 
base than Cl????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
chemical reaction by appealing to a chemical property, in this case, the weakness of bases. 
Vertical explanations demonstrate that chemical phenomena can be derived from quantum 
mechanics. They show that, given the (approximate) truth of quantum mechanics, the 
phenomenon observed had to have happened. Horizontal explanations are especially good for 
comparing and contrasting explanations, which allows the explanation of trends. In the above 
example, by appealing to the weakness of Br? as a base, the chemist invokes a chemical property. 
This allows the chemist to explain methyl bromide's reactivity as compared to methyl chloride, 
and also methyl fluoride, methyl iodide and so on. Insofar as chemists want to explain trends, they 
make contrastive explanations using chemical concepts. 
 
 Apart from Hoffmann, earlier chemists argued that the nature of chemical explanations 
need not be overshadowed by quantum mechanical and reductive approaches. Consider, for 
instance, the perspective taken by Coulson: 
 
The role of quantum chemistry is to understand these concepts and show what are the 
essential features in chemical behavior. [Chemists] ??????????????????????? ?????????
H?F bond is so strong, when the F?F bond is so weak. They are content to let 
spectroscopists or physical chemists make the measurements; they expect from the 
quantum mechanician that he will explain why the difference exist??? ????????
explanation must not be that the computer shows that [the bonds are of different 
length], since this is not an explanation at all, but merely a confirmation of 
experiment. (Coulson 1960) 
 
 Although both Coulson (1960) and Hoffmann (1998) defend the use of simple, idealised 
models to generate horizontal explanations, it is not clear that quantum calculations can never 
generate contrastive explanations (Weisberg et al. 2011). Although single vertical explanations 
are not contrastive, a theorist can conduct multiple calculations and in so doing, generate the 
information needed to make contrastive explanations. However the status of quantum mechanical 
explanations in chemistry is likely to be challenged for some time yet to come given the history of 
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?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
illustrate that chemical explanations are metaphorical in nature and have a character that is 
distinguishable from representations employed in other fields of scie????????????????????
explanatory in themselves. For the chemist to make effective use of powerful computational 
resources there must still be an underlying metaphorical model of what is happening in the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????chemical explanations involve the use of 
???????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
straightforward particularly in relation to its import in chemical education. The presence of 
models in different disciplines related to chemical education, such as cognitive psychology and 
philosophy of science makes it even more difficult to come up with a single definition for the 
?????????????????????? ?????????????? 
 
 A particular approach to chemical explanations ?????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
are explained by using diagrams instead of mathematical equations and laws. In that respect, the 
field of organic chemistry poses a difference in terms of the content of explanations from those in 
other physical sciences. Goodwin investigates both the nature of diagrams employed in organic 
chemistry and how these diagrams are used in the explanations. The diagrams particularly 
mentioned are structural formulas and potential energy diagrams. Structural formulas are two-
dimensional arrangements of a fixed alphabet of signs. This alphabet includes letters, dots, and 
lines of various sorts. Letters are used as atomic symbols; dots are used as individual electrons, 
and lines are used as signs for chemical bonds.  
 
Structural formulas in organic chemistry are mainly used as descriptive names for the 
chemical kinds. Thus a structural formula has a descriptive content consisting of a specification of 
composition, connectivity, and some aspects of three-dimensional arrangement. Structural 
formulas are also used as models in organic chemistry. For example, a ball and stick model is 
used in explanations. After characterising some features of structural formulas, Goodwin presents 
a framework of explanations in organic chemistry and describes how both structural formulas and 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????o support his idea about the role of diagrams in capturing the nuances of 
explanations through structures in organic chemistry.   
 
 Debates on reduction ? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????? (Scerri 2000b, p. 407) ? has taken chemical explanations to its 
??????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
have centred on issues related to philosophy of mind, particularly in the context of Multiple 
Realisability (e.g. Fodor 1974). Educational applications of such debates have been promoted 
though not yet realised at the level of schooling (e.g. Erduran 2005). One aspect of this debate has 
concerned the notion of supervenience. Two macroscopic systems that have been constructed 
from identical microscopic components are assumed to show identical macroscopic properties, 
whereas the observation of identical macroscopic properties in any two systems need not 
necessarily imply identity at the microscopic level. Chemical explanations have often been 
regarded as including microscopic, macroscopic and symbolic dimensions (e.g. Jacob 2001). The 
main position promoted in this debate is that the asymmetry in the way that properties and kinds 
of chemical entities are conceptualised suggest that chemical explanations cannot necessarily be 
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reduced to explanations of physics ? a realm of epistemology - even if ontologically chemistry 
might be reliant on physical principles. 
 
4.2.1  Explanation in Chemistry Textbooks 
 
Kaya and Erduran (2011) believe that structural explanations as discussed by Goodwin (2008) 
have relevance for chemistry textbooks. In their study of secondary chemistry textbooks across 
grade levels, they noted, for example, that for the 9th grade textbooks, topics such as 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????Similar ways of coverage are noted in the textbook 
by Hsu and colleagues (2010). In the chapter on organic chemistry, for example, there are sections 
????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appendix A depicts the textbook reference to 
structural isomers of 2-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????e has the same 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 541). The 
rest of the text is similar in terms of providing definitions for the characterisation of isomers. 
There are two types of representations that are both 2-dimensional but one represents the C and H 
atoms balls whilst the other does not. In this sense, there is potential for confusion for what counts 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
4.3  Summary  
 
This paper focused on the context, the definitions, and the types of laws and explanations in 
biology and chemistry and described some emphases and patterns that illustrate a number of 
similarities and differences between biological and chemical laws and explanations. For example, 
when the types of explanation in chemistry and biology are contrasted, the result is a diversity of 
types that are distinctive to the science in question. While biological explanations include 
viability and developmental explanations that draw closely from the nature of biological content, 
chemical explanations focus on the structural and representational explanations that are either 
based on quantum mechanical or simple chemical models. The context of debates around the 
nature of biological and chemical laws and explanations are also rather particular. Whereas 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????s of laws, the chemists are 
preoccupied with questions regarding axiomatisation and approximation. 
 
 
5  Implications for Biology and Chemistry Education 
 
This section provides some suggestions for how biology and chemistry education can be informed 
by investigations into the nature of laws and explanations. It illustrates the implications of the 
preceding discussion for teaching, curriculum and learning in biology and chemistry education. 
Design of instructional activities can exemplify more explicitly the role that variation and chance 
play in biological systems and enable students to explore the contribution of this uniqueness to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
generalisations and principles in biology allows students to appreciate their role in the 
construction of biological knowledge, and enables them to realis???????????????????????????????????
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
biology to a ??????????????? 
 
 In terms of chemistry teaching, the goals of teaching could include the broader aims of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
generated and how they differ from laws in chemistry or other sciences.  Lesson activities could 
acknowledge the observation that, for instance, the Periodic Law will be manifest in the 
classroom via comparative discussions about the trends in the chemical and physical properties of 
elements. Furthermore, engaging students in the process of the derivation of some of these trends 
is likely to give them a sense of how laws are generated and refined in chemistry.  How can such 
discussions of laws, then, be manifested in the classroom?  Earlier work has identified strategies 
such as questioning and discussion in chemistry teaching (Erduran 2007) that can be extended to 
biology teaching due to their broad pedagogical scope.  For example, students could be presented 
with alternative accounts of scientific laws  ? those derived deductively and those that are derived 
with approximation and induction in mind ? and asked to question, compare, evaluate and discuss 
them in relation to other products of scientific knowledge. 
 
 This review also has implications for the design of curricula for the inclusion of biological 
and chemical content knowledge. With respect to biology, curriculum materials should attempt to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
for consilience among a proposed family of explanations. Including these ideas in the curriculum 
should not be limited to presenting isolated narratives about how biologists work but should be 
reflected in developing more integrated and coherent content frameworks. This is necessary for 
promoting a more holistic and contextual understanding of structures and processes in biotic 
systems. Even though the chemistry curriculum typically covers structural explanations as 
described by Goodwin (2008) across various levels of schooling, the meta-perspectives on the 
nuances of these explanations are not typically part of either curriculum materials or textbooks 
(Kaya & Erduran 2011). 
 
 The discussion about the power and limits of biological and chemical laws can be initiated 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
do and fail to do. Curricula and textbooks tend to cover laws in quite an ambiguous and limited 
manner (i.e. McComas 2003) and often present laws in different science fields on equal footing. 
That is, when certain generalisations are labeled as laws, textbook authors do not contextualise or 
explore what that label means. From the point of view of a teacher or student, a law in physics 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????Periodic).  In some cases, ne?????? ?????????????????????????????????
are introduced as laws and consequently an opportunity to discuss the implications of these terms 
is lost. A study of Turkish chemistry curricula and textbooks, for example, revealed that there is 
little or no differentiation of the meta-perspectives on the nature of knowledge (Kaya & Erduran  
2011).  Other studies on textbooks (e.g. Niaz & Rodriguez 2005) point to lack of attention to NOS 
features in general, let alone the nuanced distinctions addressed here. Understanding the 
relationship of laws and explanations to theories in biology and chemistry demands a deliberate 
undertaking from historical and contemporary perspectives. 
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 Furthermore, chemistry curricula often contain conceptual mistakes and thus demand 
close????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????- ???????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
taking on different shapes (Kaya & Erduran 2011). The dynamic nature of molecular shape is an 
inherent aspect of chemical explanations. Coverage of structural explanations with meta-level 
perspectives is likely to minimise misconceptions about the dynamic nature of molecules. 
Chemistry curricula also need to scaffold stude????????????????????????????????????????????????
can rest on structural models and how these differ from, for instance, historical or evolutionary 
explanations in biology. Design of instructional activities would, then, need to acknowledge the 
observation that explanations will be manifest in the classroom via discussions of the signs and 
symbols that make up the alphabet of structures represented in chemistry. Engaging students in 
the generation, evaluation and application of structural explanations in chemistry is likely to 
improve their understanding of how chemical language and explanation relate to each other. 
 
 There are important reasons for why biology and chemistry learning should be informed 
by the issues raised in the paper. Familiarising students with different types of explanation in 
biology may mitigate against straying into teleological sidetracks, favoring the capacity/causal 
type, or privileging some types of explanation over others (those dealing with the how over those 
dealing with the why). The tendency of students to favor experimental over historical 
explanations, for example, has been documented in the context of evolutionary theory (see for 
example, Dagher & BouJaoude 2005). Thus, biology learning could focus on constructing and 
utilising a broad range of biological explanations for a given phenomenon and applying this kind 
of reasoning to multiple contexts/phenomena. In support of this kind of learning, there needs to be 
a re-structuring of the content/curriculum, so that explanations addressing different aspects of the 
phenomenon under study are not isolated from each other as is typically the case (e.g. 
evolutionary and ecological concepts are rarely discussed in relation to each other or to 
physiological concepts in school science). With respect to chemistry learning, the articulation of 
structural explanations with meta-level perspectives is likely to assist in understanding the 
dynamic nature of molecules. As discussed earlier, a common problem in chemical education 
concerns the interpretation of molecular models and straying onto static notions of molecular 
structures as sidetrack in learning outcomes. Given the centrality of molecular structure and 
modeling in chemistry, improvement in the learning of the structural explanations is likely to have 
positive impact on understanding other related areas of chemistry. 
 
 In summary, the aspects of laws and explanations in biology and chemistry emphasised in 
this paper are not exhaustive but are representative of the types of issues that concern us as 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????science. This understanding 
will be enriched if students are provided multiple opportunities to develop meta-level 
understanding of how particular domains of science engage with some of the key aspects of 
scientific knowledge such as laws and explanations. There has been long standing criticism of 
science education in failing to enable students to understand the nature of science, scientific 
knowledge and scientific knowledge development.  Whilst science educators have acknowledged 
that perspectives from history and philosophy of science can promote a deeper understanding of 
the nature of science, the role of the nature of disciplinary knowledge has been under-investigated 
within the science education research community. The aim of this chapter was to articulate the 
nature of laws and explanations in biology and chemistry so as to extend and enrich the previous 
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agendas for teaching the nature of science using domain-specific epistemologies to describe key 
debates and features related to disciplinary knowledge. Further research in this area is needed to 
further clarify, refine, challenge, and expand some of the claims presented in this paper. 
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Appendix A    Source of potential confusion about structural explanations in a high school 
chemistry textbook (Reproduced from Hsu et al. 2010, p. 541). 
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